

# Irregular Warfare The Future Military Strategy For Small States

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**Hybrid Warfare** - Williamson Murray  
2012-07-09  
Hybrid warfare has been an integral part of the

historical landscape since the ancient world, but only recently have analysts - incorrectly - categorised these conflicts as unique. Great

powers throughout history have confronted opponents who used a combination of regular and irregular forces to negate the advantage of the great powers' superior conventional military strength. As this study shows, hybrid wars are labour-intensive and long-term affairs; they are difficult struggles that defy the domestic logic of opinion polls and election cycles. Hybrid wars are also the most likely conflicts of the twenty-first century, as competitors use hybrid forces to wear down America's military capabilities in extended campaigns of exhaustion. Nine historical examples of hybrid warfare, from ancient Rome to the modern world, provide readers with context by clarifying the various aspects of conflicts and examining how great powers have dealt with them in the past.

### **Crafting Strategy for Irregular Warfare -**

Thomas a Marks 2020-08-04

The 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy made headlines by officially downgrading terrorism as a national security priority in favor of "inter-

state strategic competition." Many interpreted the statement as signifying a return to "conventional combat," yet a closer reading suggests that even state-based competition is likely to be "irregular." Much like insurgent adversaries, states blend separate instruments of power to offset military weakness, weaponize narratives to ease strategic progress, and exploit social and political contradictions to undermine and divide target societies. The effort to understand this approach has generated new jargon-"hybrid war," "the gray zone"-yet the United States and the West in general struggle to overcome their entrenched presumptions about war. Such confusion constitutes an upstream source of analytical friction with implications for how strategy is conceived and implemented. Based on the pedagogical approach of the College of International Security Affairs within the National Defense University, this article presents an analytical framework to assess and respond to irregular threats. Though

terminological precision and analytical frameworks are no panacea for the malaise facing Western strategy, it is an indispensable starting point for all that must follow.

**Afghan Endgames** - Hy Rothstein 2012-01-06

The United States and its allies have been fighting the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan for a decade in a war that either side could still win. While a gradual drawdown has begun, significant numbers of US combat troops will remain in Afghanistan until at least 2014, perhaps longer, depending on the situation on the ground and the outcome of the US presidential election in 2012. Given the realities of the Taliban's persistence and the desire of US policymakers—and the public—to find a way out, what can and should be the goals of the US and its allies in Afghanistan? *Afghan Endgames* brings together some of the finest minds in the fields of history, strategy, anthropology, ethics, and mass communications to provide a clear, balanced, and comprehensive assessment of the

alternatives for restoring peace and stability to Afghanistan. Presenting a range of options—from immediate withdrawal of all coalition forces to the maintenance of an open-ended, but greatly reduced military presence—the contributors weigh the many costs, risks, and benefits of each alternative. This important book boldly pursues several strands of thought suggesting that a strong, legitimate central government is far from likely to emerge in Kabul; that fewer coalition forces, used in creative ways, may have better effects on the ground than a larger, more conventional presence; and that, even though Pakistan should not be pushed too hard, so as to avoid sparking social chaos there, Afghanistan's other neighbors can and should be encouraged to become more actively involved. The volume's editors conclude that while there may never be complete peace in Afghanistan, a self-sustaining security system able to restore order swiftly in the wake of violence is attainable.

*Irregular Warfare the Future Military Strategy for Small States* - Sándor Fabian 2015-02-17

A thought provoking essay on the possible implications of irregular warfare in national military strategy.

**Strategic Studies** - Thomas G. Mahnken 2014-01-10

The second edition of *Strategic Studies: A Reader* brings together key essays on strategic theory by some of the leading contributors to the field. This revised volume contains several new essays and updated introductions to each section. The volume comprises hard-to-find classics in the field as well as the latest scholarship. The aim is to provide students with a wide-ranging survey of the key issues in strategic studies, and to provide an introduction to the main ideas and themes in the field. The book contains six extensive sections, each of which is prefaced by a short introductory essay: The Uses of Strategic Theory Interpretation of the Classics Instruments of War, Intelligence

and Deception Nuclear Strategy Irregular Warfare and Small Wars Future Warfare, Future Strategy Overall, this volume strikes a balance between theoretical works, which seek to discover generalisations about the nature of modern strategy, and case studies, which attempt to ground the study of strategy in the realities of modern war. This new edition will be essential reading for all students of strategic studies, security studies, military history and war studies, as well as for professional military college students.

**The Political Impossibility of Modern Counterinsurgency** - M.L.R. Smith 2015-05-19

The counterinsurgency (COIN) paradigm dominates military and political conduct in contemporary Western strategic thought. It assumes future wars will unfold as "low intensity" conflicts within rather than between states, requiring specialized military training and techniques. COIN is understood as a logical, effective, and democratically palatable method

for confronting insurgency—a discrete set of practices that, through the actions of knowledgeable soldiers and under the guidance of an expert elite, creates lasting results. Through an extensive investigation into COIN's theories, methods, and outcomes, this book undermines enduring claims about COIN's success while revealing its hidden meanings and effects. Interrogating the relationship between counterinsurgency and war, the authors question the supposed uniqueness of COIN's attributes and try to resolve the puzzle of its intellectual identity. Is COIN a strategy, a doctrine, a theory, a military practice, or something else? Their analysis ultimately exposes a critical paradox within COIN: while it ignores the vital political dimensions of war, it is nevertheless the product of a misplaced ideological faith in modernization.

The Practice of Strategy - John Andreas Olsen  
2011-10-27

The Practice of Strategy focuses on grand

strategy and military strategy as practiced over an extended period of time and under very different circumstances, from the campaigns of Alexander the Great to insurgencies and counter-insurgencies in present-day Afghanistan and Iraq. It presents strategy as it pertained not only to wars, campaigns, and battles, but also to times of peace that were over-shadowed by the threat of war. The book is intended to deepen understanding of the phenomena and logic of strategy by reconstructing the considerations and factors that shaped imperial and nation-state policies. Through historical case studies, the book sheds light on a fundamental question: is there a unity to all strategic experience? Adopting the working definition of strategy as 'the art of winning by purposely matching ends, ways and means,' these chapters deal with the intrinsic nature of war and strategy and the characteristics of a particular strategy in a given conflict. They show that a specific convergence of political objectives, operational schemes of

manoeuvre, tactical moves and countermoves, technological innovations and limitations, geographic settings, transient emotions and more made each conflict studied unique. Yet, despite the extraordinary variety of the people, circumstances, and motives discussed in this book, there is a strong case for continuity in the application of strategy from the olden days to the present. Together, these chapters reveal that grand strategy and military strategy have elements of continuity and change, art and science. They further suggest that the element of continuity lies in the essential nature of strategy and war, while the element of change lies in the character of individual strategies and wars.

**Future War and the Defence of Europe** - John R. Allen 2021

Future War and the Defence of Europe offers a major new analysis of how peace and security can be maintained in Europe: a continent that has suffered two cataclysmic conflicts since

1914. Taking as its starting point the COVID-19 pandemic and way it will inevitably accelerate some key global dynamics already in play, the book goes on to weave history, strategy, policy, and technology into a compelling analytical narrative. It lays out in forensic detail the scale of the challenge Europeans and their allies face if Europe's peace is to be upheld in a transformative century. The book upends foundational assumptions about how Europe's defence is organised, the role of a fast-changing transatlantic relationship, NATO, the EU, and their constituent nation-states. At the heart of the book is a radical vision of a technology-enabling future European defence, built around a new kind of Atlantic Alliance, an innovative strategic public-private partnership, and the future hyper-electronic European force, E-Force, it must spawn. Europeans should be under no illusion: unless they do far more for their own defence, and very differently, all that they now take for granted could be lost in the maze of

hybrid war, cyber war, and hyper war they must face.

*Relational Maneuver* - U S Military 2019-04-08

This is an extremely impressive and comprehensive late 2018 report. Based on historical lessons learned from irregular warfare case studies, and internal organizational analysis, this thesis seeks to provide Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) with specific implementable recommendations based on Edward Luttwak's concept of relational maneuver. Luttwak defines relational maneuver as a style of warfare that requires a deep understanding of the threat and its operational environment to identify vulnerabilities, adapt, and exploit those weaknesses to destroy the enemy as a system. Luttwak argues that irregular warfare requires effective implementation of relational maneuver to achieve operational and strategic success. The U.S. military's experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2009 through 2016 have

revealed insufficient use of relational maneuver, favoring, instead, employment of attrition warfare, which focuses on optimizing internal organizational efficiency without understanding, or adapting to, the threat or the operational environment. Through this research, the authors seek to influence MARSOC's organizational strategy to more effectively wage irregular warfare. The final recommendations provide a possible path to MARSOC for overcoming institutional challenges inhibiting the employment of relational maneuver in irregular warfare. I. Introduction \* II. Relational Maneuver: An Analytical Framework \* III. Case Study: Vietnam, An Ineffective Evolution Toward Relational Maneuver \* IV. El Salvador: "Not A Military War" \* V. Afghanistan: "Still A Question Mark" \* VI. SOF Advantages-Introduction \* VII. Organizational Design and MARSOC \* VIII. Synthesis, Analysis, And Recommendations \* IX. Discoveries, Disclaimers, and Further Research \* 2019 U.S. Intelligence Community Worldwide

Threat AssessmentThe evidence suggests that the root of the U.S. military's strategic failures in irregular warfare lies in ineffective implementation of what modern strategist Edward Luttwak defines as relational maneuver. Relational maneuver is a style of warfare that focuses on studying a threat to identify and exploit vulnerabilities to achieve strategic success. This style of warfare requires a deep understanding of the threat and operational environment and the adaptation to exploit threat vulnerabilities. In irregular warfare, adaptation and exploitation must occur through both political and traditional military competition. The U.S. military, including SOF, disproportionately applies maneuver through traditional military violence rather than political competition. This study draws upon the strategic context outlined by the 2018 NDS, the projected prevalence of future irregular warfare, credible research on irregular warfare, historical U.S. military lessons, and internal organizational

analysis to produce implementable recommendations to the Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC). These recommendations are intended to enhance MARSOC's ability to wage irregular warfare and influence successful strategic outcomes in line with the 2018 NDS. Three intermediate arguments underpin the final recommendations. First, irregular warfare is fundamentally more complex, dynamic, and uncertain than doctrinally defined traditional warfare due to political competition that occurs at every level of warfare. Second, U.S. military strategic success in irregular warfare requires applying relational maneuver, which enables the necessary understanding and adaptation to identify and exploit threat vulnerabilities in uncertain operational environments. Third, SOF and MARSOC need to better apply relational maneuver through both political competition and military violence.

The New Legions - Edward B. Atkeson 2012



In an era of extensive foreign commitments and seemingly perpetual irregular warfare, America's traditional national security model no longer works. Our forces are exhausted, our small wars stalemated, and our defense budget under inexorable downward pressure. In *The New Legions*, Major General (Ret.) Edward B. Atkeson reviews the political and military strategies that brought us to this point and proposes an innovative solution: shifting the military burden from U.S. soldiers and Marines to friendly indigenous fighters recruited, trained, and equipped for operation in their native environments. Looking back through history as far as the Roman Empire, Atkeson finds ample precedent for the effectiveness of similar legions of fighters. He lays out how such a program would work and shows how these legions could help the United States achieve its global objectives in six troublesome regions from South America to Southeast Asia in a more cost-effective way. *The New Legions* will be of

interest to policy makers, military strategists, and all citizens seeking a more effective military strategy.

*Decoding Al-Qaeda's Strategy* - Michael Ryan  
2013-07-09

The first book to draw a blueprint for defeating al-Qaeda on ideological rather than military grounds.

**Understanding Modern Warfare** - David Jordan  
2016-07-14

A fully revised and updated new edition of this leading introduction to the theory and conduct of warfare in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The book combines analysis of key concepts, theory and military doctrine with reference to relevant examples from history, and integrates the land, sea and air environments. [Gangs, Pseudo-Militaries, and Other Modern Mercenaries](#) - Max G. Manwaring  
2012-10-11

As the first decade of the twenty-first century has made brutally clear, the very definitions of war and the enemy have changed almost beyond

recognition. Threats to security are now as likely to come from armed propagandists, popular militias, or mercenary organizations as they are from conventional armies backed by nation-states. In this timely book, national security expert Max G. Manwaring explores a little-understood actor on the stage of irregular warfare—the gang. Since the end of the Cold War, some one hundred insurgencies or irregular wars have erupted throughout the world. Gangs have figured prominently in more than half of those conflicts, yet these and other nonstate actors have received little focused attention from scholars or analysts. This book fills that void. Employing a case study approach, and believing that shadows from the past often portend the future, Manwaring begins with a careful consideration of the writings of V. I. Lenin. He then scrutinizes the Piqueteros in Argentina, gangs in Colombia, private armies in Mexico, Hugo Chavez’s use of popular militias in Venezuela, and the looming threat of Al Qaeda in

Western Europe. As conventional warfare is increasingly eclipsed by these irregular and “uncomfortable” wars, Manwaring boldly diagnoses the problem and recommends solutions that policymakers should heed.

**Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy** - Colin S. Gray 2006

The author offers a detailed comparison between the character of irregular warfare, insurgency in particular, and the principal enduring features of "the American way." He concludes that there is a serious mismatch between that "way" and the kind of behavior that is most effective in countering irregular foes. The author poses the question, Can the American way of war adapt to a strategic threat context dominated by irregular enemies? He suggests that the answer is "perhaps, but only with difficulty."

*War, Peace and International Relations* - Colin S. Gray 2013-06-17

*War, Peace and International Relations* provides an introduction to the strategic history of the

past two centuries, showing how those 200 years were shaped and reshaped extensively by war. The book takes a broad view of what was relevant to the causes, courses, and consequences of wars. Written by leading strategist Professor Colin Gray, the book provides students with a good grounding in the contribution of war to the development of the modern world, from the pre-industrial era to the age of international terrorism and smart weapons. This second edition has been thoroughly revised and updated: It is the first one-volume strategic history textbook on the market; It covers all the major wars of the past two centuries; It is up to date and comprehensive, including a new section on the American Civil War, a new chapter on geography and strategy, and completely rewritten chapters on Iraq and Afghanistan in the 2000s and on irregular warfare. This textbook will be essential reading for students of strategic studies, security studies, war studies, international

relations and international history.

**The Airpower Advantage in Future Warfare: The Need for Strategy** - Colin S. Gray 2012

Modern Military Strategy - Elinor C. Sloan  
2016-10-11

This textbook provides a comprehensive introduction to post-Cold War military theory for students of strategic studies. This second edition has been fully revised and updated, including a new chapter on peacekeeping, and examines contemporary strategic thought on the conduct of war in the sea, land, air, nuclear, space and cyber domains, as well as irregular warfare. Each chapter identifies contemporary strategic thinkers in a particular area, examines strategic thought through the lens of identifiable themes, and discusses the ideas of classical strategists to provide historical context. Examples of the link between the use of military force and the pursuit of political objectives are presented, such as airpower against ISIS and in Libya,

counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq, counter-piracy operations off the coast of Africa, and the Stuxnet virus in Iran. The chapters identify trends, statements and principles that indicate how military power can best be employed to effect political ends, while the conclusion paints an overall picture of the relationship between classic and contemporary strategic thinking within each warfare domain. This book will be essential reading for students of strategic studies, war studies and military history, and is highly recommended for students of security studies and international relations in general.

The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare - Stephen Biddle 2008-09-28

The future of non-state military actors is a central issue for U.S. strategy and defense planning. It is widely believed that such combatants will be increasingly common opponents for the U.S. military, and many now advocate sweeping change in U.S. military

posture to prepare for this the debate over the associated agenda for "low-tech" or irregular warfare transformation is quickly becoming one of the central issues for U.S. defense policy and strategy. As a prominent recent example of a non-state actor fighting a Westernized state, Hezbollah's 2006 campaign thus offers a window into a kind of warfare that is increasingly central to the defense debate in the United States. And the case's implications for U.S. policy have already become highly controversial. Some see Hezbollah as an essentially terrorist organization using an information age version of the asymmetric military methods seen as typical of non-state actors historically. This view of Hezbollah as an information age guerrilla force strengthens the case for a major redesign of the U.S. military to reposition it for irregular warfare. Its advocates differ in the particulars, but most would expand the Army and Marine Corps; reequip this larger ground force with lighter weapons and vehicles; restructure it to

deemphasize traditional armor and artillery in favor of light infantry, civil affairs, military police, military advisor, and special forces capability; and reengineer training, doctrine, Service culture, recruitment, and promotion systems to stress low-intensity irregular warfare skills and methods rather than conventional combat. And major changes in the interagency process would be needed to replace a balkanized, slow-moving decision-making system with one agile and integrated enough to compete effectively with politically nimble, media savvy opponents in portraying the results of such warfare persuasively to public audiences overseas. If so, the needed changes in the defense program would be extremely expensive. Many would pay for this by scaling back or abandoning hi-tech air and naval modernization programs; reducing the size of the Air Force and oceangoing Navy; and cutting back the ground forces' training and preparation for conventional war fighting. The result would be a very

different American military and defense establishment—from its size to its structure, equipment, people, and doctrine. Others, however, see Hezbollah's 2006 campaign as a major departure from the asymmetric methods of traditional terrorists or guerrillas and as a shift toward the conventional military methods normally associated with state actors. What is new in this account is how much the 2006 campaign differed from terrorist or guerrilla warfare information age or not—and how conventional and state-like the fighting was. This view of Hezbollah as a conventional army weakens the case for irregular warfare transformation. Instead it implies that a conventionally structured military is actually better suited for a future of non-state opponents than low-tech transformation advocates claim. Where capabilities for low intensity combat can be improved without undermining conventional performance this would always be wise, but many in this camp see sharp tradeoffs between

the forces and training needed for irregular as opposed to conventional combat; if so, then radical transformation would be ill advised and traditional force structures, doctrines, and training are a better course for the future.

U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare - Nicholas J. Schlosser 2015

U.S. Marines in Irregular Warfare: Training and Education is a brief history that recounts how the U.S. Marine Corps adapted to fight the Global War on Terrorism during 2000-10. The Marine Corps has a long history of fighting irregular wars, including the Banana Wars in Central America during the 1920s and the Vietnam War during the 1960s. To battle the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Corps drew upon this experience while also implementing new plans and programs to better prepare Marines to carry out counterinsurgency operations. The Marine Corps updated the curriculum at the Command and Staff College and transformed the annual Combined Arms

Exercise into Exercise Mojave Viper: an immersive training program that simulated the urban environments in which Marines would be operating in Southwest Asia. Most importantly, Marines adjusted in the field, as battalion and company commanders drew on their basic training and education to devise innovative tactics to better combat the new threats they now faced. ?us, as this story shows, the Marine Corps did not undergo a radical transformation to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan, but instead drew on principles that had defined it as a warfighting organization throughout most of its history. Keywords: United States Marine Corps; United States Marines; U.S. Marine Corps; U.S. Marines; Marines; Marine Corps; Global War on Terrorism; global war on terrorism; irregular warfare; military strategy; counterinsurgency; combat; iraq war; Iraq War; Afghanistan; military education; soldier training; combat training and tactics; Southwest Asia  
*Irregular Warfare* - Arnold Milton 2012

At present, America's enemies are of an irregular character. These irregular enemies necessarily wage war in modes that are largely unconventional. Joint operations concepts describe how the joint force is expected to conduct joint operations within a military campaign in the future. They identify the broad military capabilities necessary to achieve the ends envisioned by the concept. Since the original version of the Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept was approved in September 2007, the understanding of irregular warfare has continued to evolve. This book explores how the joint forces must operate to counter irregular threats and to guide force development, material and non-material capability development, and experimentation when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, to prevent, deter, disrupt and defeat non-state actors, as well as state actors who pose irregular threats.

**Military Strategy, Joint Operations, and Airpower** - Ryan Burke 2018-09-03

An ideal textbook for classes on modern airpower and joint operations.

*The New Counterinsurgency Era* - David H. Ucko 2009-07-02

Confronting insurgent violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military has recognized the need to “re-learn” counterinsurgency. But how has the Department of Defense with its mixed efforts responded to this new strategic environment? Has it learned anything from past failures? In *The New Counterinsurgency Era*, David Ucko examines DoD’s institutional obstacles and initially slow response to a changing strategic reality. Ucko also suggests how the military can better prepare for the unique challenges of modern warfare, where it is charged with everything from providing security to supporting reconstruction to establishing basic governance—all while stabilizing conquered territory and engaging with local populations. After briefly surveying the history of American counterinsurgency operations, Ucko

focuses on measures the military has taken since 2001 to relearn old lessons about counterinsurgency, to improve its ability to conduct stability operations, to change the institutional bias against counterinsurgency, and to account for successes gained from the learning process. Given the effectiveness of insurgent tactics, the frequency of operations aimed at building local capacity, and the danger of ungoverned spaces acting as havens for hostile groups, the military must acquire new skills to confront irregular threats in future wars. Ucko clearly shows that the opportunity to come to grips with counterinsurgency is matched in magnitude only by the cost of failing to do so.

**The American Way of Irregular War** - Charles T. Cleveland 2020-09-15

The United States has failed to achieve strategic objectives in nearly every military campaign since Vietnam. This memoir describes how the United States can begin to build the American

way of irregular war needed for success in modern conflict.

**Nonstate Warfare** - Stephen Biddle 2021-04-06  
"Armed nonstate actors have received increasing attention since September 11th, 2001, both from scholars and from policy makers and soldiers-- and with this attention has come a vibrant debate about whether nonstate civil warfare and insurgency is the future of war, and if so, how it should be countered. Yet underlying these debates is one crucial shared assumption: that states and nonstate actors fight very differently. Biddle upturns this distinction in *How Nonstate Actors Fight*, examining actual military methods to show that many nonstate actors now fight more "conventionally" than many states. Rather than a dichotomy, Biddle frames nonstate and state methods along a continuum and presents a systematic theory to explain any given nonstate actor's position on this spectrum. His theory emphasizes how actors' internal politics - especially their institutional maturity and war



aims - determine their military choices. In doing so, Biddle bridges to largely opposing groups of scholarship: materialists who assume that material and structural constraints will lead nonstates to prefer irregular warfare, and culturalists who see nonstate warmaking as connected to social norms. Biddle integrates both materialist and cultural considerations into this theory, but emphasizes internal politics as the chief determinant of how any actor will fight. The first four chapters present Biddle's theory, and the next five test it across a range of historical examples, from Lebanon to Iraq to Somalia to Croatia to the Vietcong"--

**The Complexity of Modern Asymmetric Warfare** - Max G. Manwaring 2012-09-05

Today more than one hundred small, asymmetric, and revolutionary wars are being waged around the world. This book provides invaluable tools for fighting such wars by taking enemy perspectives into consideration. The third volume of a trilogy by Max G. Manwaring, it

continues the arguments the author presented in *Insurgency, Terrorism, and Crime and Gangs, Pseudo-Militaries, and Other Modern Mercenaries*. Using case studies, Manwaring outlines vital survival lessons for leaders and organizations concerned with national security in our contemporary world. The insurgencies Manwaring describes span the globe. Beginning with conflicts in Algeria in the 1950s and 1960s and El Salvador in the 1980s, he goes on to cover the Shining Path and its resurgence in Peru, Al Qaeda in Spain, popular militias in Cuba, Haiti, and Brazil, the Russian youth group Nashi, and drugs and politics in Guatemala, as well as cyber warfare. Large, wealthy, well-armed nations such as the United States have learned from experience that these small wars and insurgencies do not resemble traditional wars fought between geographically distinct nation-state adversaries by easily identified military forces. Twenty-first-century irregular conflicts blur traditional distinctions among

crime, terrorism, subversion, insurgency, militia, mercenary and gang activity, and warfare. Manwaring's multidimensional paradigm offers military and civilian leaders a much needed blueprint for achieving strategic victories and ensuring global security now and in the future. It combines military and police efforts with politics, diplomacy, economics, psychology, and ethics. The challenge he presents to civilian and military leaders is to take probable enemy perspectives into consideration, and turn resultant conceptions into strategic victories.

Terrorism and the New Age of Irregular Warfare - United States. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities 2010

*Understanding Future Irregular Warfare Challenges* - United States. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities 2012

The Filipino Way of War - Fernando M. Reyeg 2011

The Filipino Way of War is the dominant irregular warfare strategy executed by the Filipino warrior throughout the centuries. Armed with severely limited resources, a strong fighting spirit, and deep traditions, the Filipino warrior has always had to look for another method of warfare other than direct and total war. This has led to the indirect path, the path of irregular warfare. This tradition, built upon a foundation of tribal warfare, shaped by resistance to Spanish and American colonization, and honed during the guerrilla campaign against the Japanese occupation, has emerged in the modern era as the predominant Filipino military strategy. Entering the 21st century, conflict in the Philippines has not been focused on external invaders, but on internal division. In this era, both government and anti-government forces have recalled their traditions and experiences and predominantly used irregular warfare

strategies, often through unconventional warfare, insurgency, or special operations. As external military influences wane, it is important to understand and prepare the Armed Forces of the Philippines for the future by understanding their past history, so that the Filipino warrior will be better prepared for tomorrow.

Keeping Special Forces Special - U. S. Military  
2018-04-08

This unique book examines military regional proficiency. Regional proficiency is a critical capability in irregular warfare (IW). In preparation for increased engagement in irregular warfare, the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Military Services made several significant improvements in developing regional proficiency. While the DoD is attempting to create a new capability in the majority of the Total Force, Special Forces was created to succeed in an IW environment. As a result of its design, Special Forces valued and developed regional proficiency long before this became

topical in DoD. Oddly, the last decade of overseas contingency operations that spurred interest in regional proficiency in DoD overall has also threatened regional proficiency development in Special Forces. An analysis of Special Forces training and development reveals that the Special Forces' primary means of developing regional proficiency is through deployment experience. While the Special Forces Groups are regionally aligned, several have consistently deployed outside of their Area of Responsibility (AOR) to support combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. A survey and a series of interviews were conducted to determine the state of regional proficiency interest in Special Forces. Through survey analysis, several trends were identified. With this information, this thesis concludes with a suggested strategy to improve regional proficiency in Special Forces non-commissioned officers (NCOs). In 2001, Afghanistan suddenly became the most interesting place on Earth for

the United States defense establishment. Raised from obscurity to the highest national priority, Afghanistan became the primary interest for our national security organizations. People with knowledge and experience in Afghanistan were suddenly some of the most valuable resources in the federal government. The United States needed people with field experience and knowledge of the region to spearhead operations in Afghanistan. The 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) (SFG(A)) was the Special Forces unit aligned with the region that included Afghanistan. Then-COL Mulholland, the commander of 5th SFG(A) at the time, stated that Special Forces lacked "precise knowledge" on Afghanistan because there had been little association with the country since the 1980s. Only a few men had the regional and operational expertise required to conduct the operation in Afghanistan. Gary Schroen, a man about to retire from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was the most qualified of a very small

group. Over the course of a career, Schroen had developed extensive regional knowledge of Afghanistan and had personally dealt with many of the Northern Alliance commanders. Had the timing of 9/11 been different, Schroen could have retired and there would have been no one with the same ability within the federal government capable of executing the required mission. The nation was lucky to have Gary Schroen. Another example of luck is found in the British example of T.E. Lawrence. T.E. Lawrence was already an accomplished scholar on Arabia when World War I erupted. Lawrence escaped duties as a desk officer and became the most accomplished unconventional warrior of modern times by being a military advisor to the Arab tribes. What is notable about both cases is that the person's regional expertise went largely unrecognized until a crisis manifested. In the face of crisis, what was largely obscure knowledge can become one of the most significant items in a military strategy. It was

only by luck that both nations had these types of individuals at hand at the right time. The United States should not have to depend on luck to meet its national security needs.

**Three Dangerous Men: Russia, China, Iran and the Rise of Irregular Warfare** - Seth G. Jones 2021-09-07

How three key figures in Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran built ruthless irregular warfare campaigns that are eroding American power. In *Three Dangerous Men*, defense expert Seth Jones argues that the US is woefully unprepared for the future of global competition. While America has focused on building fighter jets, missiles, and conventional warfighting capabilities, its three principal rivals—Russia, Iran, and China—have increasingly adopted irregular warfare: cyber attacks, the use of proxy forces, propaganda, espionage, and disinformation to undermine American power. Jones profiles three pioneers of irregular warfare in Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran who

adapted American techniques and made huge gains without waging traditional warfare: Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov; the deceased Iranian Major General Qassem Soleimani; and vice chairman of China's Central Military Commission Zhang Youxia. Each has spent his career studying American power and devised techniques to avoid a conventional or nuclear war with the US. Gerasimov helped oversee a resurgence of Russian irregular warfare, which included attempts to undermine the 2016 and 2020 US presidential elections and the SolarWinds cyber attack. Soleimani was so effective in expanding Iranian power in the Middle East that Washington targeted him for assassination. Zhang Youxia presents the most alarming challenge because China has more power and potential at its disposal. Drawing on interviews with dozens of US military, diplomatic, and intelligence officials, as well as hundreds of documents translated from Russian, Farsi, and Mandarin, Jones shows how America's

rivals have bloodied its reputation and seized territory worldwide. Instead of standing up to autocratic regimes, Jones demonstrates that the United States has largely abandoned the kind of information, special operations, intelligence, and economic and diplomatic action that helped win the Cold War. In a powerful conclusion, Jones details the key steps the United States must take to alter how it thinks about—and engages in—competition before it is too late.

**Complete Guide to U. S. Military Human Terrain System (HTS), Mapping, and Teams (HTT) - Use in Afghanistan, Counterinsurgency, COIN, Operator's Guide, Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups** - U. S. Military 2017-03-05

This unique book reproduces six important military reports and studies dealing with the Human Terrain System (HTS), mapping, and teams. In the years following the invasion of Iraq, the United States military did not fully realize or understand the complexity of the

situation faced by soldiers operating at the tactical and operational level. Coupled with the presence of multiple insurgent networks throughout the country, sectarian violence along ethnic and religious divides resulted in an escalation of violence. This violence forced a realization that the conflict had entered a new phase, and the military looked to classic examples of counterinsurgency (COIN). Consequently, theater strategy and doctrine development began to focus on identifying the population as the center of gravity (COG) of the COIN effort. Along with this new strategy came the requirement for a deep understanding of the Iraqi culture and the ability to conduct research and learn about the cultural aspects of the Iraqi society. This capability was found to be missing in U.S. combat formations. To address this deficiency, the Human Terrain System (HTS) was created in 2006 as a means for units to better understand and leverage culture at the operational and tactical level. Since the initiation

of the program, the HTS has deployed Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) to Iraq and Afghanistan to integrate with brigades and augment existing staff structures with social science expertise. Initial reports from the field indicate the program to be largely successful. Despite reported success, the program has been the subject of much controversy, and questions remain as to whether it is the right solution for integrating cultural understanding into counterinsurgency operations. This monograph finds that although the HTS adequately fills the intended requirement by providing social science expertise down to the tactical level, it is also necessary to increase the cultural competence of the entire force. Additionally, the Army must bolster organic capabilities of tactical formations in order to be prepared for the unexpected challenges of the future. Documents in the collection: Human Terrain Mapping and Its Application for Counterinsurgency Operations in Afghanistan Lost In Translation:

The Importance Of Retaining Army Sociocultural Capabilities In An Era Of Persistent Conflict  
Quantifying Human Terrain Cultural Understanding in Counterinsurgency: Analysis of the Human Terrain System Mapping the Human Terrain in Afghanistan An Operator's Guide to Human Terrain Teams - CIWAG Case Study on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups - The ultimate goal in creating HTS was to supplement military and civilian efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan by providing a subject matter capability and helping to interpret social grievances and the role they play in conflict. By identifying the factors leading to violence, Human Terrain Teams (HTT) help field operators, commanders, and policy officials better understand the civilian population. Each program assists with strategy implementation, consensus building, and casualty reduction. Secondary efforts focus on leveraging community resources and gradually reducing US and NATO expenditures - measures that will

help achieve the end goal of Afghan self-sufficiency. Further, HTS's capability is aimed at helping military and civilian leadership map out a nexus of second- and third-order effects, an activity that will ultimately increase operational efficiency and maintain combat strength. Sections I and II of this case study explore how HTT advisors can aid operators and military/civilian leadership in the irregular warfare battle-space. The sections begin with a community profile that identifies the social, cultural, economic, and political issues affecting a specific local environment.

### **Irregular War** - Paul Rogers 2016-06-16

If the rise of Islamic State can overthrow powerful states in a matter of weeks, what kind of a secure future can the world expect? After more than a decade of the war on terror, security specialists thought that Islamist paramilitary movements were in decline; the threat from ISIS in Syria and Iraq, Boko Haram in Nigeria, al-Qaida in Yemen, the chaos in Libya

and the return of the Taliban in Afghanistan have all shown that to be wishful thinking. Once again the West is at war in the Middle East. Paul Rogers, the distinguished global security specialist, provides a much-needed look at the rise of such global terrorist movements from the margins and presents a new argument as troubling as it is compelling. While Islamic State has taken root in the Middle East and North Africa and has increasing impact across the world as thousands of young men and women rally to its cause, Rogers argues that it should be seen not just as a threat in its own right but as a marker of a much more dangerous world riddled with irregular war.

### **Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?** - Colin S. Gray 2012-08-04

Strategist Colin Gray offers a detailed comparison between the character of irregular warfare, insurgency in particular, and the principal enduring features of "the American



way." He concludes that there is a serious mismatch between that "way" and the kind of behavior that is most effective in countering irregular foes. The author poses the question, "Can the American way of war adapt to a strategic threat context dominated by irregular enemies?" He suggests that the answer is "perhaps, but only with difficulty."

*"Making Riflemen from Mud"* - James D. Campbell 2007

Prior to World War II, the Army had a deeply ingrained facility with and acceptance of what we now term unconventional warfare -- raising, training, advising and cooperating with tribal militias, local paramilitaries, and other non-state armed groups. This culture of irregular warfare was attributable to nearly 300 years of American military tradition from the colonial period until 1941, including extensive experience in cooperating with Native American tribes and individual scouts during the expansion of the western frontier. These traditions of

unconventional war reached maturity in the years of fighting on the western plains after the Civil War, and were given ultimate expression in the creation of the Philippine Scouts at the beginning of the 20th century. Since World War II, the wider military has lost this expertise in and comfortable familiarity with unconventional operations, with the Special Operations community taking on the sole proprietorship of this role. Given the variety of political environments in which today's conventional soldiers may find themselves, and the current nature of conflicts ongoing and likely to occur in the world, the Army culture as a whole can and must readapt itself to the new old realities of irregular war.

**National Security Dilemmas** - Colin S. Gray 2009

A contemporary primer on the leading arguments about U.S. national security, *National Security Dilemmas* addresses the major challenges and opportunities that are live-issue

areas for American policymakers and strategists today. Colin S. Gray provides an in-depth analysis of a policy and strategy for deterrence; the long-term U.S. bid to transform its armed forces' capabilities, with particular reference to strategic surprise, in the face of many great uncertainties; the difficulty of understanding and exploiting the challenge of revolutionary change in warfare; the problems posed by enemies who fight using irregular methods; and the awesome dilemmas for U.S. policy over the options to wage preventive and preemptive warfare. With forty years' experience as a strategist, within and outside of government, Gray uses a problem-solving motif throughout the book, suggesting solutions to the challenges he identifies. The book's master narrative is that the United States must take a more considered strategic approach to its security dilemmas. Too often, the country's leaders decide on a policy and then move to take action, all the while neglecting to devise a plan that would connect

its political purposes to military means. While many of Gray's judgments here are critical of current ideas and behavior, he crafted them as helpful guides should planners adopt them when revising policies and approaches. Strategy is a practical matter; truly it is the zone wherein theory meets practice. This text can be used as an expert guide to the major national security challenges of today. It both explains the structure of these challenges and provides useful answers. With a foreword by Lt. Gen. Paul K. Van Riper, USMC (Ret.), Bren Chair, Marine Corps University, Quantico, Virginia.

**Full Spectrum Dominance** - Maria Ryan  
2019-09-24

America's war on terror is widely defined by the Afghanistan and Iraq fronts. Yet, as this book demonstrates, both the international campaign and the new ways of fighting that grew out of it played out across multiple fronts beyond the Middle East. Maria Ryan explores how secondary fronts in the Philippines, sub-Saharan

Africa, Georgia, and the Caspian Sea Basin became key test sites for developing what the Department of Defense called "full spectrum dominance": mastery across the entire range of possible conflict, from conventional through irregular warfare. Full Spectrum Dominance is the first sustained historical examination of the secondary fronts in the war on terror. It explores whether irregular warfare has been effective in creating global stability or if new terrorist groups have emerged in response to the intervention. As the U.S. military, Department of Defense, White House, and State Department have increasingly turned to irregular capabilities and objectives, understanding the underlying causes as well as the effects of the quest for full spectrum dominance become ever more important. The development of irregular strategies has left a deeply ambiguous and concerning global legacy.

General Purpose Force Capability - Michael W. Minor 2010

"The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and DoD's [Department of Defense's] current defense strategy calls for U.S. forces sized, shaped, and with the right mix of capabilities to meet future challenges across the widest possible spectrum of conflict. Throughout history, determining and anticipating the required capabilities needed to defeat future threats has proven to be a challenge. Over four years ago the U.S. military assessed the requirement to increase irregular warfare capability. Little has changed to date to increase proficiency and capability beyond what military members and organizations have done internal to adapt to conditions on the ground. This thesis finds that the U.S. military continues to experience great difficulty in defining and implementing the required changes needed to increase irregular warfare capability within our general purpose forces. Complex and laborious processes within the joint community, Service inertia and resistance to change, strategy that defers hard choices, and competing factors

within the strategic environment increase the risk to achieving the envisioned balance of capabilities along the widest possible spectrum of conflict. This paper recommends that future capabilities be clearly defined based [on] hard-strategy driven decisions. Additionally, force structure, procurement, and professional military education need reform that moves them in line with the joint capabilities we desire for the future joint force. Until this is done, General purpose forces (GPF) will be forced to rely on their proven ability to adapt to complex environment for which they did not adequately anticipate or for which they were not fully prepared."--Abstract

Armed Groups and Irregular Warfare - Richard H. Shultz 2009-09-01

Conflict in the 21st Century differs markedly from the way the United States thought about and prepared for war and defense during most of the 20th Century. Armed Groups remain key actors, having strategic impact at the local,

state, regional, and even global level. As these implications come into sharper focus, change is taking place in military doctrine and operations. To prepare tomorrow's warriors and their intelligence counterparts for these challenges, the professional military education program (PME) of the US Department of Defense also needs to adapt to the new strategic context. To assist in the development of this education, in 2005 the National Strategy Information Center initiated a project to develop curricula about the armed group phenomenon, and to prepare PME faculty to teach the subject in the nation's professional military schools, colleges, and universities. NSIC has been at the forefront of innovating and institutionalizing education on major dimensions of security studies with military and civilian partners for more than 40 years. The new curriculum was developed in consultation with the leadership of America's top military schools, and was refined at two week-long seminars for military and civilian

faculty. The authors, all experienced faculty, present the dimensions of the 21st century security environment, and describe the evolution of the curricula development. This groundbreaking syllabus on Armed Groups and Irregular Warfare is in five parts, each with defined learning objectives, substantive subject matter, and annotated references of the key literature. The 21st century global security environment and the key role of armed groups

Types of armed groups; insurgents, militias, terrorists, and organized crime

Profiling armed groups and movements: A new approach to the order of battle

Strategic, regional, and indirect threats from armed groups and opportunities

Meeting the Challenge: the whole of government approach

*United States and Unconventional Warfare - Al Qaeda's Exploitation of American Weakness, Iran and Proxy Terrorism, Hizbollah, China's Holistic Asymmetric Warfare Plan, Future Adversaries* - Department of Defense 2017-04-27

Given the success of terrorist organizations against the United States since 1983 it is prudent to ask if nations will pursue unconventional engagements with the United States. According to the National Defense Strategy, "U.S. dominance in conventional warfare has given prospective adversaries, particularly non-state actors and their state sponsors, strong motivation to adopt asymmetric methods to counter our advantages. For this reason, we must display a mastery of irregular warfare comparable to that which we possess in conventional combat." What are the implications for future National Defense Strategies? The United States of America is no stranger to unconventional warfare. The American Revolution was the United States' first experience in terrorism and guerrilla warfare. The National Defense Strategy of 2008 states that the conventional warfare dominance of the United States will remain unchecked for the foreseeable future. However, despite its ability

to defeat a conventional enemy, the United States has shown an inability to effectively deal with an enemy, either nation-state or non-state actor, that employs terrorism and asymmetric warfare as a means to engage in combat. The United States' conventional dominance has been no deterrent to terrorism. While the immediate adversaries in the Global War on Terrorism campaign are Al Qaeda and its allies, the reality exists that legitimate nation-states would resort to unconventional warfare operations in order to defeat the United States in a future conflict. Iran supports terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, Iran continues to develop nuclear technology. The United States must be prepared to face nations, like China, that have a far broader program for unconventional warfare that includes cyber, satellite, economic, diplomatic, and information warfare. The United States needs to adopt a new definition of full-spectrum operations. Previously, this phrase was equated to the combined arms concept used by

the military. In order to defeat an unconventional threat, full-spectrum operations must encompass all the instruments of national power and be able to meet the unconventional adversary at their level and, if possible, preempt their attack. It will require the United States to develop an unconventional strategy and the capability to employ that strategy. Through economics, diplomacy, information operations, propaganda, alliance building, military might, governmental subversion and fear, the United States can defeat an unconventional enemy. *SOF and the Future of Global Competition* - Claire Graja 2019

The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) makes clear that competing effectively with state adversaries will be the primary focus of the Department of Defense (DOD) going forward. Irregular warfare (IW) is a key element of modern great power competition (GPC), and our adversaries are deftly exploiting unconventional methodologies— particularly the use of

information and intermediaries (i.e., proxies and surrogates)—as mediums of national influence. In March 2019, CNA hosted a cohort of academic, government, and military experts for a discussion on how special operations forces

(SOF) can best lead or support US Government (USG) efforts to compete successfully on a global scale using information operations and intermediary partnerships. The discussion is summarized and synthesized in this document.